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NOTES 
MARINA POINT, LTD. V. WOLFSON: A 
VICTORY FOR CHILDREN IN RENTAL 
HOUSING-IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER 
EXPANSION OF THE UNRUH CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT · 
In Marina Point, Ltd. u. Wolfson l the California Supreme 
Court held that the Unruh Civil Rights Act protects children 
and families with children from discrimination.2 The court fur-
ther held that the owner of a large apartment complex could not 
arbitrarily evict a family because they had a child.8 
The Unruh Civil Rights Act· (the Act) prohibits discrimina-
1. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982), cert. denied, _ U.S. 
_ (1982). The United States Supreme Court refused to review the plaintiff's appeal in 
October 1982. The appeal was based on a procedural claim and on the assertion that the 
state supreme court relied on evidence not presented to the trial court and which had 
not been cross-examined by the plaintiff. According to Eugene Gratz, attorney for the 
Wolf80ns, the evidence in question consisted of published reports of findings presented 
by expert witnesses at the trial. Telephone interview with Eugene Gratz, Gratz & Starler, 
Los Angeles, California, (October 5, 1982). 
The Supreme Court, without comment, left the ruling intact. Adults-Only- Rentals 
Still Illegal, San Francisco Cbron., Oct. 4, 1982, at A14, col. 5. 
The California Supreme Court opinion, written by Justice Tobriner, was joined by 
Chief Justice Bird and Justices Newman, Broussard and Retired Associate Justice White 
sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council. The dissenting 
opinion was written by Justice Richardson with Justice Mask concurring. 30 Cal. 3d at 
722,640 P.2d at 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 497. 
2. rd. at 724, 640 P.2d at 116, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
3. rd. at 745, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. 
4. CAL. ClV. CODE § 51 (West 1982) provides: 
This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act. 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free 
and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, 
ancestry, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services 
in all business establishments of every kind whatever. 
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or 
privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or 
697 
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tion based on sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national ori-
gin in all business establishments in California. Prior to Wolfson 
the California Supreme Court declared in In Re Cox" that the 
enumerated protected classes in the Act were "illustrative rather 
than restrictive" and thus the scope of the Act was broader than 
the protection of designated classes. The Act covers all arbitrary 
discrimination in public accommodations.s 
In Wolfson, the court held that landlords cannot arbitrarily 
discriminate against children and families with children. This 
Note will discuss this aspect of the Wolfson decision and its sig-
nificance and implications. Wolfson resolved the issue of dis-
crimination in rental housing against families with children,7 
which will be of particular benefit to women who have been 
hardest hit by such discrimination and by the shortage of rental 
housing.s But, Wolfson also may have extended the coverage of 
the Unruh Civil Rights Act to include classes other than chil-
dren. This Note will also discuss this equally important aspect 
of the' Wolfson decision. 
which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, 
religion, ancestry, or national origin. 
5. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970). Cox involved a situation 
where a man was arrested pursuant to a local ordinance after he refused to leave a shop-
ping center. He was asked to leave because he was seen talking with a person wearing 
long hair and unconventional attire, a "hippie." The court found the exclusion unreason-
. able and arbitrary. 
6. Id. at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31. 
7. The problems of discrimination against families with children is not limited to 
low income families. A 1980 national survey showed that approximately one-third of the 
renting population are families with children. MARANS & COLTEN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH MEA-
SURING RENTAL POLICIES AFFECTING CHILDREN (1980). 
Steven Wolfson is an example of the affect that discrimination against children has 
on moderate and upper income families. Wolfson is an attorney who lived in an ocean-
side apartment complex with several swimming pools. 30 Cal. 3d at 744 n. 13,640 P.2d at 
129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510. See also BERKELEY, CAL. CODE § 4853-NS § I, ch. 13.24(D): 
"This discrimination [against families with children in property rentals] falls most heav-
ily on the poor but cuts across all racial, ethnic and economic levels." (Emphasis added.) 
8. Twice as many households headed by women are tenants as compared to non-
female headed families. Women head fifteen percent of all families, but twenty-nine per-
cent of all-renter families. Comment, Why Johnny Can't Rent - An Examination of 
Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Against Families In Rental Housing, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1829, 1836-37 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Why Johnny Can't Rent]. 
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I. THE HOUSING PROBLEM PRIOR TO Wolfson 
A. Housing Shortage 
699 
The determining factor in the Wolfson decision was the 
court's recognition of the housing needs of families with children 
as well as the social and economic problems created by discrimi-
nation against them.9 Several factors coalesced to create the cur-
rent rental housing shortage. Among them are population 
growth,IO high interest rates and building costs which have con-
stricted new apartment construction and the ability of many 
families to buy a home,l1 condominium coversions,12 the deterio-
ration of existing housing stock,13 and the growing divorce rate 
9. 30 Cal. 3d at 743, 640 P.2d at 128, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510. 
10. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 50003 (West 1980) for legislative recognition 
of the statewide housing shortage. For further discussion of the dimensions of the Cali-
fornia housing problem, see also Comment, Local Attempts to Ban Discrimination in 
Rental Housing Against Families with Children: Avoiding the Preemption Barrier, 17 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 403 (1980). For a description of the national housing shortage refer to 
Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 8, at 1829-33, and Note, Housing Discrimination 
Against Families with Children: A National Concern, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 307 (1980-81). 
Various California newspapers have commented on the increasing seriousness of the 
housing shortage, e.g., How A Home Can be Renovated to Produce Granny Flats, San 
Francisco Chron., July 11, 1982, at 4, col. I, which proposes the addition of rental flats to 
single family homes as a solution to the critical housing problem; Tenants' Rights for 
Children, Oakland Tribune, Aug. 14, 1981, at A16, col. I, stating that sixty percent of the 
state's rental units exclude children at a time when there is a scarcity of housing for the 
total population; and A Frustrating Decade Ahead for the Baby Boom Homebuyers, San 
Francisco Examiner, June 14, 1982, at C3, col. 5, which notes that the homebuying age 
group, thirty to thirty-five, increased by 10 million between 1970 and 1980. 
11. Homeownership: the American Dream Adrift, San Francisco Examiner, June 14, 
1982, at C1, col. 6. Few young people can afford to borrow money at high interest rates, 
thus, home buying is limited to established upper middle-class people. See Note, Housing 
Discrimination against Children: The Legal Status of a Growing Social Problem, 16 J. 
FAM. L. 559, 562 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Housing Discrimination) (fewer fami-
lies are able to buy houses as the competition for rental units increases). 
Home ownership is currently out of the reach of low, middle and some upper income 
families. CAL. SEN. COMM. ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, 1977 STATEWIDE HOUSING PLAN AND 
HOUSING ELEMENT at 2 (1977). 
12. Condominium units increased from 18,700 in 1976 to 102,000 in 1978. There 
were 2,000 conversions in 1975, 9,200 in 1978, and a projected 20,000 by the end of 1979. 
The effect of these conversions is to substantially reduce the number of available rental 
units. When low and moderate income tenants are displaced because they cannot buy 
their units, renters who were previously housed are forced to compete for already scarce 
low-rent housing. CAL. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, UPDATE OF THE 
1977 CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE HOUSING PLAN at 84 (1979). 
13. Many rental units have been removed from the market because owners cannot 
afford high rehabilitation costs. Of the 3.6 million rental units in California in 1979, 
350,000 units needed to be replaced and 800,000 units required rehabilitation. CAL. 
STATE ASSEMBLY SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOUSING PRODUCTION REPORT at 72-73 (1979). 
3
Farlow: Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983
700 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:697 
which requires two shelters to house persons formerly living in 
one unit. I • 
A 1979 survey found that thirty percent of California fami-
lies with children were renters. Hi These families were excluded 
from fifty-three to eighty percent of the available rental housing 
in metropolitan areas. IS Forty-five percent of renters with chil-
dren were found to be inadequately housed as compared to 
thirty-two percent of renters without children.17 This figure in-
creased from eighty-one to ninety-eight percent, depending on 
the city, for low income renters with children. IS New construc-
tion did not ease the shortage, but resulted in even more exclu-
sion of families with children. 19 
Discrimination against renters with children has resulted in 
clustering of these families in certain areas. This arbitrary clus-
tering, causing an unusually large number of children in particu-
lar neighborhoods, creates dislocations requiring additional 
schools, transportation, differential traffic controls, police pro-
tection, and recreational facilities. 20 The clustering of families 
with children in certain areas also prevents inter-generation con-
tact. Such contact benefits both children and older persons.21 
14. J .. ISERI, Low INCOME SINGLE MOTHERS AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, CALI-
FORNIA ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH at 1 (1980). This report shows that single parent 
families in California increased from one in nine in 1970 to one in five in 1980. Ninety 
percent of these families were headed by women. 
See also Big Increase in Families With Single Parent, San Francisco Chron., June 
18, 1982, at 3, col. 6, reporting that the recent Census Report showed that single parent 
families grew from 3.3 million in 1970 to 6.6 million in 1980. Most of the increase was 
attributed to divorces. In 1970, 956,000 families were headed by divorced women; in 
1980, divorced women headed 2.7 million families. 
15. D. ASHFORD & P. ESTON, THE EXTENT AND EFFECT OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
CHILDREN IN RENTAL HOUSING: A STUDY OF FIVE CALIFORNIA CITIES at v (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ASHFORD]. 
16. A sample survey of newspaper advertisements in five cities showed that children 
were excluded from more than half of the available apartment units. The percentages 
varied from seventy-one percent in Los Angeles, fifty-three percent in Fresno, sixty-five 
percent in San Diego, and seventy percent in San Jose. In contrast, in San Francisco, 
which had an ordinance prohibiting discrimination against children, twelve percent of 
the units surveyed banned all children. Id. at v. 
17.Id. 
18. Id. at vi. 
19. Id. at 7-9. 
20. Id. at 29. 
21. Id. at 33. 
Women's Law Forum 
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The concentration of renters in certain neighborhoods cor-
relates with the concentration of minorities and women and cre-
ates segregated living patterns based on race and sex.22 Racial 
imbalance in public schools has intensified as middle-class rent-
ers are forced out of the cities by the unavailability of affordable 
and desirable housing and as minority renters are excluded from 
the suburbs by high rents. as 
The California Legislature recognized this overall housing 
problem and began to develop a state-wide housing plan in 1977 
to accommodate an expected population of 24,400,000 by 1985.24 
Investigation of the factors causing the housing shortage showed 
that discrimination against children distorted the already troub-
led housing market. When a house or apartment is denied to a 
family with children, there is additional pressure on the housing 
market as these families compete for the remaining units availa-
ble to them. Rental costs increase as demand exceeds supply.llli 
This situation forces people to live in undesirable neighborhoods 
or to pay higher rents than they would otherwise pay.2S 
In recognition of this problem, the 1977 Housing Plan in-
cluded a proposal to add families with children to the coverage 
of the Fair Housing Act and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.27 This 
proposal, as well as other proposed amendments to the anti-dis-
crimination statutes, failed in the legislature.28 
22. [d. at vii. 
23. [d. at 31. 
24. CAL. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, STATEWIDE HOUSING 
PLAN OF 1977 at 18 (1977). 
25. [d. at 47. 
26. [d. at 13. 
27. [d. at 49. 
28. 30 Cal. 3d at 735 n.7, 640 P.2d at 123, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 505. See Dunaway & 
Blied, Discrimination Against Children in Rental Housing: A California Perspective, 19 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 21 at 49 n.141 (1979) for the argument that these attempts to enact 
statutes banning discrimination against children were defeated by real estate and land-
lord lobbies. The most recent attempt to add families with children to the Unruh Civil 
Rights Act was A.B. 256 (1980-81), sponsored by Assemblyman Leo McCarthy. The bill 
was dropped for the time being by its author after Wolfson was decided. Telephone in-
terview with member of Assemblyman McCarthy's staff (July 23, 1982). A report by Sen-
ator Milton Marks, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Local Government, dated 
August 12, 1981, discussed A.B. 256. This report lists a number of supporters of the bill 
and names the California Association of Realtors and the Western Mobilehome Associa-
tion as opponents. SEN. COMM. ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Staff Analysis of Assembly Bill 
256 at 3 (1981). 
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B. Discrimination 
Discrimination against families with children can take three 
forms: eviction, denial of access to housing, or higher rents and 
security deposits29 than those charged for adult-only tenants.30 
The most easily detected form is eviction because it usually in-
volves an exclusionary policy or history of trouble with a partic-
ular family's child or children as the basis of the eviction. This 
type of discrimination is quite common even where prohibited 
by local ordinances.31 
Evictions typically result from a landlord's policy change or 
new ownership. The birth of a child to a previously childless 
couple, as in the Wolfsons' case, could prompt an eviction in an 
apartment building with an existing exclusionary policy. Prior to 
the Wolfson ruling, this situation was becoming increasingly 
common as more couples and single women in their thirties 
chose to have children.32 In the absence of an express statement 
that the child is the basis for eviction, this kind of discrimina-
tion is difficult to prove. Ordinarily a landlord can terminate a 
tenancy without cause with thirty days' written notice.33 
Refusal to rent to a family with children is also very com-
29. Interview with Ed Hernandez, attorney for Metropolitan Housing Alliance, Oak-
land, Ca. (July I, 1982). 
30. See Supplemental Brief filed in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson by West Coast 
Regional Office of Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., San Francisco, Ca., at 52. See also 
Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 8, at 1836. 
31. Telephone interview with Karen Arthur, attorney for Housing Rights for Chil-
dren Project, Oakland, Ca. (July 22, 1982). Confirmed by telephone interviews with Mike 
Rosen, Hayward Legal Aides, Hayward, Ca. (July 20,1982); Michelle Kuhlman and Paul 
Smith, attorneys for Echo Housing Assistance Center, Hayward, Ca. (July 21, 1982). 
32. The New Baby Boom, TIME, February 22, 1982, at 52, discusses the trend toward 
delayed child-bearing. See also, Note, Housing Discrimination, supra note 11, at 560 for 
a similar conclusion. 
33. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1956 (West 1982). But cf., M. Moskovitz, Retaliatory Eviction 
in California: An Update, STATE BAR OF CAL. REAL PROP. NEWS, Winter 1982, at 18. CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 1942.5(c) protects a tenant from retaliation by the landlord when the tenant 
has exercised "any rights under the law." Professor Moskovitz proposes that the rights 
would also seem to be constitutional as well as statutory, and since a tenant has a right 
to have a baby, the statute may be read to prohibit the landlord from retaliating against 
the tenant for doing so. He then goes on to say that an act which might be prohibited by 
law, even if it presently is not, would not seem to be a "right under the law." If the 
statute were construed in this way, smokers, drinkers, or pet owners would not be in-
• eluded in the statutory coverage. 
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mon. 34 The problem is illustrated by the fact that housing or 
renter assistance agencies311 receive a large number of complaints 
of discrimination. It is often hard to prove the reason for the 
refusal because a landlord need not give 'any justification for not 
renting an apartment. Landlords sometimes refuse to rent to 
families with children and claim that the unit is too small for 
the family or that the unit has already been rented, even when 
this is not true.38 Some landlords may require an abnormally 
large deposit or a high ratio of wages to rent to disqualify many 
low or moderate income families. 37 
Discrimination against children and their families in rental 
housing, combines with the overall housing shor.tage, and places 
a heavy burden on society, a burden which predictably will in-
crease in scope and severity unless steps are taken to resolve the 
34. See notes 16 and 20, supra. Discrimination against children has also provided a 
loophole for landlords who are actually discriminating on the basis of race or sex. Dis-
crimination Against Kids - A Victory!, 9 HOUSING L. BULL. at 24 (July-August 1979). 
35. A Los Angeles agency received over a thousand calls a year from families with 
children who wanted to file complaints because they were having housing problems. Dec-
laration of Louis Moss, Executive Director of Fair Housing Congress of Southern Califor-
nia (FHCSC), in Robinson and Presley v. Green, No. C-203059, (Super. Ct., Los Angeles 
County, filed June 21, 1977). 
The Housing Rights for Children Project in Oakland received 548 complaints of dis-
crimination against children from female heads of households between December 1980 
and June 1982. Telephone interview with Karen Arthur, Director, Housing Rights for 
Children Project, Oakland, Ca. (July 22, 1982). 
A recent federal case, Coles v. Havens Realty Corporation, 633 F.2d 384 (1980), gave 
standing to sue to a housing agency whose purpose was to eliminate unlawful discrimina-
tory practices. Although this case involved racial discrimination, the court commented 
that "[hlousing, as a personal choice right of a citizen, is no less important than other 
rights affecting human dignity, such as unfettered access to public facilities." [d. at 387. 
If this right of standing could be invoked to give public agencies the right to sue for 
violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, more low income people would be encouraged 
to participate in such suits. 
36. The determination that a particular factor is the basis for unlawful discrimina-
tion can be made by using "testers." This process involves sending at least two persons, 
similar in all respects but one, i.e., race, sex, children, etc., to apply for a particular 
rental unit or one in a particular group of units. If the landlord agrees to rent to the one 
without the particular factor to be tested, and refuses to rent to the one who has it, then 
the presumption is that the factor is the reason for the refusal. This procedure generally 
takes place pursuant to a complaint by an aggrieved party to an agency whose function is 
to assist tenants who believe they have been victims of discrimination. Interview with Ed 
Hernandez, supra note 29. 
37. An unusually large deposit violates the statute limiting advance rental deposits 
to two months' rent for an unfurnished residence and three months' rent for a furnished 
residence. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1950.5(c) (West 1980). 'I 
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problem. This, then is the situation the court attempted to re-
dress in Wolfson. 
II. THE Wolfson DECISION 
A. Facts of Wolfson 
The Wolfsons had no children when they leased their apart-
ment at the Marina Point complex. After renting the unit, Mrs. 
Wolfson had a child. The landlord notified the couple that their 
lease would not be renewed because they had violated the minor 
child exclusion provision of the rental agreement. The Wolfsons' 
refused to vacate the apartment. The landlord then filed an un-
lawful detainer action against them.38 
The apartment was one of several hundred in the complex. 
The units were originally designed for adult occupany; however, 
the previous landlord had rented to families with children. A few 
months after the Wolfsons leased their apartment, their land-
lord instituted a policy to exclude all children. Those tenants 
with children were allowed to remain, but no new families with 
children or pregnant women would be allowed to rent an apart-
ment. The implementation of the policy proceeded rather slowly 
as shown by the fact that families with children were still living 
in the Marina Point apartments at the time of the trial. 39 
The trial court granted the unlawful detainer and ruled that 
the Unruh Act did not include children, parents with children, 
or families with children as a protected class. '0 The California 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the legislative intent of 
the Unruh Act was to prohibit all arbitrary and unreasonable 
discrimination based on class membership, and that children 
and families with children came within the purview of the 
statute.'1 
B. Majority Analysis 
The court's inquiry focused on three issues: the legal issue 
of preventing all arbitrary discrimination; the social issue per-
38. CAL. CIV. PRoe. CODE § 1161 (West 1982). 
39. 30 Cal. 3d at 741, 640 P.2d at 127, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
40. [d. at 724, 640 P.2d at 116, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
41. [d. at 725, 640 P.2d at 117, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
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taining to the shortage of adequate rental housing and its effect 
on California families; and the issue of society's duty to protect 
its young. The core of the court's reasoning concerning these is-
sues was its assertion of individual rights and the legislature's 
intent to protect them. The court identified a state interest in 
protecting the rights of families and children and found that this 
interest is more compelling than those of landlords and tenants 
who desire a child-free environment. 
The narrow issue before the court was whether or not the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act would prohibit a landlord from refusing 
to rent an apartment to a family simply because the family in-
cluded a minor child.42 The court rejected the trial court's deter-
42. Id. at 727, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 499. The Wolfsons' lease defined 
minors as persons under age eighteen. The Wolfsons' appeal from the trial court decision 
asserted violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and their rights 
to familial privacy and equal protection under the state and federal constitutions. The 
supreme court determined that the matter could be resolved under the civil rights stat-
ute and declined to address the other challenges. Id. at 730, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. at 502. Under CAL. Gov. CODE § 12995(c) (Deering 1982) formerly the Fair Housing 
Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 35700, 35720 (West 1980) discrimination is not 
prohibited if based on factors other than race, color, religion, sex, marital status, national 
origin or ancestry. Discrimination against children and families with children would not 
directly violate this statute. See Comment, Landlord Discrimination Against Children: 
Possible Solutions to the Housing Crisis, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 609, 624 (1978) for the 
argument that marital status might be grounds for including children and parents within 
the ambit of the Fair Housing Law. 
The housing statutes are more restrictive in the number of protected classes, but 
they cover rental housing and housing for sale. The Unruh Civil Rights Act only covers 
housing for sale when sold by a business enterprise. Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 
Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962). 
These differences are somewhat reconciled by CAL. Gov. CODE § 12993(c) which 
states, in pertinent part: "While it is the intention of the Legislature to occupy the field 
of regulation of discrimination in ... housing encompassed by the provisions of this 
part ... nothing in this part shall be construed, in any manner or way, to limit to re-
strict the application of section 51 of the Civil Code." 
The court's decision not to address the constitutional questions raised by the defen-
dants appears to be based on a lack of necessity for deciding these issues, "because we 
conclude that the landlord's exclusionary policy violates the Unruh Act we need not, and 
do not, reach the Wolfson's additional contentions." 30 Cal. 3d at 730, 640 P.2d at 120, 
180 Cal. Rptr. at 502. 
Underlying the decision not to discuss the constitutional issues may have been the 
essentially private nature of the conflict. 30 Cal. 3d at 748, 640 P.2d at 131, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. at 513. It could have been argued that as the apartment complex was located on 
land leased from Los Angeles County, there was sufficient state involvement for a judi-
cial determination of the constitutional questions. Id. at 726, 640 P.2d at 117, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. at 499. Further, under Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), judicial enforcement 
of the unlawful detainer action might be construed as sufficient state action. However, on 
the contrary, the definition of landlord-tenant relationships has been deemed a legisla-
9
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mination that a landlord could exclude children and their fami-
lies because children may be expected to be noisier and more 
troublesome than adults,43 and because children and their fami-
lies were not protected by the Act." The court stated that the 
protected classes enumerated in the Act were meant to be "illus-
trative rather than restrictive," language taken from In Re 
Cox.n 
The court held that the Act applied to rental housing and 
that Marina Point, Ltd. was subject to the Act.46 It determined 
that the legislature did not intend to limit the protective reach 
of the Act, but intended to prohibit all arbitrary discrimination 
by business establishments.4? 
The majority summarily dismissed the landlord's argument 
that, under the second sentence of the Unruh Act, discrimina-
tion against all persons regardless of sex, race, religion, ancestry 
or national origin was beyond the scope of the Act. If the land-
lord's proposed interpretation were accepted, persons could be 
excluded from public accommodations because of sexual prefer-
ence or political affiliation. The court remarked that such an in-
terpretation would be a retreat from a long-established statutory 
policy prohibiting all arbitrary discrimination in public 
accommodations.48 
Next, the court rejected the landlord's argument that exclu-
tive rather than a judicial function, and thus, out of the court's jurisdiction. Lindsey v. 
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971). 
It is interesting to note that the federal government has shown some interest in 
providing housing for children. Under the Federal Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1713(b)(2) 
(1976),24 C.F.R. § 207.20 (1977), the federal housing program makes mortgage insurance 
benefits available to landlords who certify that they do not discriminate against children. 
In this case, where the decisive theory was a violation of a civil right rather than a 
property right, the court could have decided the case on a constitutional basis had it 
elected to do so. 
43. 30 Cal. 3d at 724, 640 P.2d at 116, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
44. [d., 640 P.2d at 116, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
45. [d. at 725, 640 P.2d at 116, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
46. [d. at 731, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502. Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. 
App. 2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1962) (Unruh Act was applicable to rental housing in a 
case where a man was denied housing because of his race); Abstract Investment Co. v. 
Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962); Flowers v. John Burnham & 
Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971). 
47. 30 Cal. 3d at 732, 640 P.2d at 121, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
48. [d. at 734, 640 P.2d at 122, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 504; See supra note 4. 
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sion of children was reasonable because they are "noisier and 
rowdier" than adults and that such exclusion was not arbitrary 
but is rationally related to an interest in preserving a quiet envi-
ronment.49 The court stated that exclusion of an "entire class of 
individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction that the class 
'as a whole' is more likely to commit misconduct than some 
other class" would be invalid under the Act. Even if the general-
ization about a class is true, an individual member of the class to 
whom the generalization does not apply cannot be denied his or 
her statutory rights. Only an individual's disruptive conduct, not 
membership in a class based on "status" or group classification, 
provided grounds for exclusion from public accommodations.llo 
Evidence was presented in Wolfson which showed that the 
defendants' child's behavior was not disruptive. The court con-
.eluded therefore that there was no justification for individually 
excluding him and his parents, especially when other children 
were still permitted to live in the apartment complex.lIl 
Thus, the court determined that membership in a class ex-
pected to behave in a certain way must be coupled with actual 
misconduct for exclusion to be justified. This decision effectively 
overruled Flowers .u. John Burnham & CO.,1I2 which permitted a 
landlord to exclude male children over five years of age. The 
Flowers court held that eviction of a family with children was 
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable because children can be 
noisy, boisterous and mischievous. liS 
49. [d. at 737, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 506. 
50. [d. at 740, 640 P.2d at 126, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
51. [d. at 728, 640 P.2d at 118, 119, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 505. The court used the terms 
"children" and "families with children" interchangeably. It is not clear just which class 
was being protected. However, it is reasonable to assume that both groups were included, 
particularly in connection with rental housing given the fact that minor children usually 
share a home with family members (parents, blood relatives or legal guardians). 
The use of the term "families with children" is significant in that the Act's coverage 
would not be limited to the nuclear family. This is important in those situations where 
the adult seeking a rentSl unit is not the parent of the child who will be living there. 
These cases could arise as a result of adversity, either the death or absence of a parent, 
which requires that a child or children live with some one else. 
The value of the extended family was recognized by the United States Supreme 
Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). The Court held that a 
city ordinance prohibiting extended families in one residence violated the constitutional 
rights of privacy and family relationships. 
52. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971). 
53. [d. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 647. 
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Based upon its "reasonableness" analysis, the court also re-
jected the landlord's contention that the apartment complex's 
facilities were unsuitable for use by children. The court noted 
that the complex's facilities, such as swimming pools and un-
gated walkways to the ocean, were not incompatible with occu-
pancy by children, but had, in fact, been used by children for 
several years:14 The landlord's exclusionary policy was also dis-
tinguishable from age-limited admissions policies for retirement 
communities and specially designed senior citizen housing units. 
Marina Point apartments served no special purpose such as pro-
viding a peaceful and quiet environment for the benefit of the 
elderly. 1111 No societal interest, such as protecting children from 
harmful activities or safety hazards, could be achieved by their 
exclusion. liS On the contrary, if the presence of a hazard to chil-
dren's health or safety could justify child discrimination, land-
lords could evade the Act by adding "some incidental facility 
which posed a special danger to an undesired class of potential 
patrons."117 Evasion of the Act's provisions cannot be allowed so 
easily. The court concluded that there was no reasonable basis 
for the landlord's arbitrary discrimination.lIs 
It rejected the landlord's absolute right to select his or her 
tenants by noting that this right was already circumscribed by 
the Act.lIe The inference is that adding another class of tenants 
who cannot be arbitrarily excluded or rejected would do little 
harm to a landlord's already limited discretion. A landlord's 
right to maximize profits (economic gain) is not a reasonable ba-
sis for exclusion. 
The court did not discuss the rights of non-elderly tenants 
who would prefer to live in a child-free residential facility. The 
majority did make a passing reference to tenants' interests when 
it refused to sanction the "sacrifice of the well-being of children 
on the altar of a landlord's profit, or possibly some tenants' 
convenience. "so 
54. [d. at 744 n.13, 640 P.2d at 129 n.13, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511 n.13. 
55. [d. at 742, 640 P.2d at 127, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 509. 
56. [d. at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. 
57. [d. at 730, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502. 
58. [d. at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. 
59. [d. at 730, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502. 
60. [d. at 745, 640.P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. 
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The court noted that the legislature specifically allowed mo-
bile home parks to enforce "adults only" regulations. It specu-
lated that this action may have been taken because the special 
features of mobile home parks, their cost, unit size, and the age-
homogeneous environment, closely correlate with the needs of 
the elderly. There was no attempt to reconcile the legislative in-
tent to provide some child-free residential areas with the intent 
to bar all arbitrary discrimination under the Act. The court 
noted that several attempts to enact legislation barring discrimi-
nation against children in'rental housing had failed to pass, and 
commented that unadopted proposals have little value as evi-
dence of legislative intent. Thus, the failure of these proposals 
was not to be interpreted as an indication of the legislature's 
intent to provide child-free residences.61 
In the absence of a statute protecting the rights of children 
and their families by specific designation, the Wolfson court 
used the broader civil rights statute to solve a serious social 
problem: the shortage of decent housing for households with 
children.6l1 The rationale was that to allow landlords to continue 
arbitrary discrimination against children would sanction "wide-
spread and potentially universal, exclusion of children from 
housing. "68 
C. The Dissent 
The dissent concluded that the exclusionary policy would be 
justified since the apartments had been originally planned for 
all-adult occupancy. The dissent disagreed with the majority's 
61. [d. at 735, 736 n.7, 640 P.2d at 123 n.7, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 505 n.7. See CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 798.76, 799.5 (West 1982). 
62. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the court saw the need to resolve a seri-
ous problem and took the most direct route. Many other states have statutes prohibiting 
discrimination against children. They include: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York and the 
District of Columbia. Why Johnny Can't Rent, supra note 8, at 1829-30 n.4. Several 
California cities have local ordinances prohibiting housing discrimination against chil-
dren. They are: Berkeley, Davis, Fresno, Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose 
and Santa Monica. [d. 
The outcome of the case had no direct effect on the W olfsons. They had vacated 
their apartment before the appeal was heard. However, the outstanding judgment for 
damages, attorney fees, and costs, as well as the importance of the issue prevented the 
appeal from being rendered moot. 30 Cal. 3d at 730 n.3, 640 P.2d at 120 n.3, 180 Cal. 
Rptr. at 501 n.3. 
63. [d. at 743, 640 P.2d at 128, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510. 
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suggestion that the present owner was barred from using his 
property for its intended purpose merely because the previous 
owner had not chosen to do so. It conceded that a different con-
clusion would follow had the premises been designed for "gen-
eral" use, not specifically for adult rentals.e• 
III. IMPACT AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The Wolfson court expanded the coverage of the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act by including children and families with children 
as protected classes. No prior state or case law had made such a 
determination.ea Now, if a tenant believes that an eviction's pur-
pose is to remove children, she can use the Wolfson ruling as a 
defense to an unlawful detainer action.ee 
Although the holding is intended to ameliorate the housing 
problems of families with children, it does not apply to all rental 
housing. Landlords in mobile home parks may still exclude chil-
dren under California law.e., The status of condominium owners 
who wish to rent units controlled by covenants, conditions or 
regulations excluding children, however, was recently deter-
mined in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, where the 
California Supreme Court stated that "the restrictive covenant 
against children is already invalid under Marina Point as to 
64. [d. at 745, 748, 640 P.2d at 129, 132, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 512, 513. 
65. 30 Cal. 3d at 724, 640 P.2d at 116, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 498. 
66. See Note, Housing Discrimination, supra note 11, at 576, 578, for the notion 
that in the absence of a statute preventing housing discrimination against families with 
children, a judicial determination that such discrimination occurred can only be used as 
a defense, as in an ejectment action. Although judicial intervention may prevent an evic-
tion, it will not help a family find a place to live. 
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.76 (West 1982) allows rules and regulations limiting resi-
dence to adults only in mobile home parks. These statutes may be open to a constitu-
tional challenge. The state's interest in protecting the elderly will be a decisive factor on 
this issue because the majority of mobile home park residents are over sixty. CAL. COMM. 
ON HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY, HOUSING FOR THE 
ELDERLY at 2 (1976). Over ninety percent of California's mobile home parks are for 
adults only. [d. 
As long as these adults-only restrictions are upheld, an affordable housing option 
will be denied to families with children. No Room for 'Adults Only', Los Angeles Times, 
Sept. 10, 1981, at 8, col. 1. 
An additional problem created by the uncertainty of acceptable age limits is that 
adults also complain about arbitrary age limits which may deny them access to mobile 
home parks. CAL. DEPT. OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING, FIELD OPERATIONS DIRECTION 
No. 22 at 1 (1982). 
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units held as income property and rented out by their owners."68 
Furthermore, a sublessor who executes a written lease with a 
sublessee is barred from excluding children.69 
One result of Wolfson is that businesses open to the public 
may not arbitrarily deny access to minors unless the denial is 
permitted by statute70 or otherwise related to the services per-
formed and the facilities provided.71 Exclusion based on the pre-
sumption that children may be nuisances or thieves would be 
prohibited as arbitrary discrimination. 
A recent case, American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Superior 
Court72 relied on the Wolfson holding in determining that the 
local ordinances of two California towns were overbroad.78 The 
ordinances denied access to children unaccompanied by parents 
to supermarkets, convenience stores, drug stores, and bookstores 
which sold and displayed books, magazines or other publications 
portraying sexually explicit material. 74 
In addition to finding that the ordinances WQuid have a 
"chilling effect ... on the exercise of free speech,"711 the court of 
appeal noted that "the California Supreme Court has recently 
68. No. LA 31495, Slip op. at 11 (Cal. Supreme Court May 9, 1983). In 1982 the 
California Supreme Court granted a hearing and remanded O'Connor for consideration 
in light of the Wolfson decision. The court of appeal declined to follow Wolfson and held 
that a condominium association could enforce rules prohibiting occupancy by families 
with children who owned a unit although a local ordinance would have allowed the owner 
to rent to a family with children. O'Connor u. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 132 Cal. App. 
3d 173, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1982). 
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 53 (West 1982) prohibits any written instruments, including a 
lease, to discriminate against the classes designated in the Act. Should this section be 
construed as part of the anti-discriminatory scheme of the Act, then children and their 
families would be protected. In a separate concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Village 
Green Owners Ass'n, No. 31495, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Supreme Court May 9, 1983) (Brous-
sard, J., concurring), Justice Broussard stated that section 53 was sufficient to invalidate 
the condominium association's discriminatory restrictions. He noted that section 53 dealt 
specifically with discriminatory restrictions on the use of real property and was intended 
by the legislature to receive the same illustrative reading as section 51. [d. at 1. 
70. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West 1983) prohibits furnishing alcoholic bev-
erages to minors under twenty-one; CAL. PEN. CODE § 313.1 (West 1982) prohibits the 
distribution of "harmful matter" to minors. 
71. 30 Cal. 3d at 737, 640 P.2d at 124, ISO Cal. Rptr. at 506. 
72. 129 Cal. App. 3d 197, 181 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1982). 
73. [d. at 205, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 38. 
74. [d. at 199, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 34. 
75. [d. at 206, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 39. 
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held ... that children as a class are protected by the Unruh 
Civil Rights Act. . . against arbitrary exclusion from businesses. 
This ruling would prohibit the type of wholesale exclusion of mi-
nors ... authorized by the subject ordinances."76 
Presently, some movie theaters commonly exclude children 
who are under sixteen and unaccompanied by a responsible 
adult, during the evening hours. This restriction is enforced for 
the purpose of ensuring "an adult atmosphere" rather than 
preventing children from seeing films with an "R" or "X" rat-
ing.77 A court could find an adult moviegoer's pleasure no more 
compelling than "tenants convenience"7s and thus, no better jus-
tification for the exclusion of children unless it concluded that 
limited access to public accommodations, admission during the 
daytime, precluded a claim of arbitrary discrimination. 
The Wolfson court specifically addressed the problem of 
discrimination against families with children in rental housing, 
but it went beyond that issue by designating children and their 
families as protected classes in terms of all public accommoda-
tions. Therefore, theaters, restaurants, hotels, stores and other 
similar businesses may no longer be able to arbitrarily refuse ad-
mission to children and their families. 
More significantly, the court left open the possibility of fu-
ture adjudications to define other classes which merit protection 
under the Act. Under the court's "illustrative rather than re-
strictive"79 interpretation of the Act, there may be few, if any, 
limits to the number and variety of classes that may be deemed 
protected. The Wolfson court stated that the protection against 
discrimination granted by the Act applied to "all persons."so 
76. Id. at 205, 206, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 38. 
77. The existence of this type of discrimination was confirmed in a telephone con-
versation with Bill Hume, Festival Cinema, Inc., Walnut Creek, Ca. (July 20,1982). The 
right to entertainment may not have the same priority 88 decent housing, but when the 
history of the public accommodations statutes which preceded the Act is considered, the 
right to entertainment and amusement has a long tradition of importance. See the his-
torical note following CAL. CIY. CODE § 51 (West 1982) referring to an earlier amend-
ment, Stats. 1905, c. 413, p. 553 § I, which included theatres, skating rinks, and "all 
other places of ... amusements" under the public accommodations statute. 
78. 30 Cal. 3d at 745, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
79. Id. at 732, 640 P.2d at 121, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503. 
80. Id. at 736, 640 P.2d at 124, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Presently, landlords can dis-
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The victim of an arbitrary exclusionary practice must be an 
"innocent" individual whose conduct does not conform to the 
generalization about the behavior of the class to which he or she 
belongs, and membership in that class must be the basis for the 
discrimination.81 Judicial interpretation has already extended 
the Act's coverage to include homosexuals, students, welfare re-
cipients, persons with a particular occupation or marital status, 
and those persons who associate with members of protected 
classes. 82 
If courts should apply a literal interpretation of the policy 
that the Act is intended to prevent discrimination against all 
persons, a number of other classifications could be found to be 
protected by the civil rights statute. Persons with psychiatric 
problems, or problems caused by alcohol or drug abuse, who 
may experience some difficulty in rental housing would be likely 
candidates for statutory protection. Similarly, young persons 
who have not yet established a credit rating, or those with poor 
credit ratings, may face discrimination by landlords who want 
criminate against tenants who have pets. A personal dislike of animals, or a fear that the 
pet owner will allow the animal to be noisy or destructive would be an insufficient basis 
for discrimination if this generalization does not apply to a particular tenant or prospec-
tive tenant. Id. at 740, 640 P.2d at 126, ISO Cal. Rptr. at 508. California law already 
allows guide, signal or service dogs in many public accommodations, CAL. CIV. CODE § 
54.2 (West 1982); bakeries, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 28204 (West 1980); and shops 
in public buildings, CAL. Gov. CODE § 6909 (West 19SO). Elderly tenants in public agency 
housing may keep two pets, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19901 (West 19SO). 
Owners of motorcycles are another group who have experienced difficulty in finding 
rental housing. Interview with Paul Smith, supra note 31. The Wolfson court specifically 
referred to motorcyclists as a group which could be excluded because the owner of a 
business enterprise had reason to believe that such a group might present greater 
problems than some other groups and rejected an interpretation of the Act that would 
permit such discrimination. 30 Cal. 3d at 739, 640 P.2d at 126, ISO Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
Smokers, waterbed owners, and ex-convicts are examples of the variety of classes 
which can be used as an excuse for discrimination by landlords. If the court should de-
cide that exclusion based on any arbitrary classification is prohibited, then these, and 
other similar classifications would be construed as classes protected by the Act. 
81. Id. at 740, 640 P.2d at 126, ISO Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
82. Id. at 736, 640 P.2d at 124, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 505. See, Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 
2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951), (homosexuals cannot be excluded from restaurants and 
bars.) See also, 59 Ops. Att'y Gen. 70, 72 (1976) for the opinion that the Act applies to 
students and young people who are likely to patronize fast food outlets and convenience 
stores in residential neighborhoods. 
A recent case, Hubert v. Williams, 133 Cal. App. 3d Supp. I, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161 
(1982), relied on Wolfson in holding that a landlord could not evict a tenant whose live-
in housekeeper was a lesbian. Neither homosexuality nor association with homosexuals is 
a justifiable reason for exclusion from rental housing. Id. at 5, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 163. 
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some assurance of prompt payment. In the absence of some rea-
sonable basis for anticipating late payment or non-payment, 
landlords would be prohibited from excluding or evicting such 
persons. 
Wolfson offers no guidelines for determination of the 
threshold number of persons required to constitute a class. The 
court referred to "broad 'status' classifications" and "broad sta-
tus-based exclusionary polic[ies]"83 but did not state how broad 
the classification must be. The court frequently emphasized the 
individual's right to be free from arbitrary discrimination and 
stated that the loss of the right must be based on a specific indi-
vidual's own conduct.8• Any exclusion "on the basis of class or 
group affiliation basically conflicts with the individual nature of 
the right afforded by the act of access to such [public] enter-
prises. "86 From this statement, it could be inferred that a class 
or group warranting protection need not be large, but need only 
have some distinctive mark on which a proprietor or landlord 
could base a presumption of group behavior.86 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A democratic society continually adjusts the tension be-
tween individual freedom and social equality. The Wolfson court 
favored equality in competition for available rental housing over 
landlords' freedom to have a significant voice in selecting 
tenants. 
If Wolfson is narrowly interpreted, it is limited to the prohi-
bition of the exclusion of children and families with children in 
rental housing.8? However, because of Wolfson, children are now 
a protected class under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. They may 
be excluded from public accommodations only if the exclusion is 
based on the facilities or services available, or if a particular 
child or children actually misbehave. 
A broader interpretation of Wolfson based on the court's re-
83. 30 Cal. 3d at 740, 640 P.2d at 126, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
84. [d. at 738, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507. 
85. [d. at 740, 640 P.2d at 126, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 508. 
86. See supra note 80. 
87. 30 Cal. 3d at 738, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507. 
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vival of its "illustrative rather than restrictive" interpretation of 
the Act, has great significance. This interpretation of Wolfson 
may be used by other classes of aggrieved tenants to claim dis-
crimination when landlords use classifications or other charac-
teristics which they find undesirable to deny housing. The court 
implied when it stated that, "under the Unruh Act we have con-
demned any arbitrary discrimination against any class,"88 that it 
would not be adverse to extending the protection of the Act to 
other as yet undefined classes. The Wolfson decision can and 
has been used by the lower courts to address a variety of dis-
criminatory practices. 
The court expanded its prohibition against age discrimina-
tion in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n by holding that 
age restrictions in covenants, conditions, and regulations estab-
lished by condominium owners associations violate the civil 
rights statute. The O'Connor court did not define another pro-
tected class, but reached the interest in privately· owned· real 
property by defining condominium associations as "business es-
tablishments" subject to the Unruh Civil Rights Act.89 
O'Connor reinforces the majority's determination to eradi-
cate arbitrary discrimination. Future cases will test the evasive 
measures used by landlords, property owners, and business in-
terests. The trend toward a broad interpretation of the Act es-
tablished by Wolfson and its progeny will benefit victims of dis-
crimination in the housing market. The majority's stance holds 
forth the promise that class-based discrimination or exclusion 
may be judicially eliminated in areas beyond public 
accommodations. 
Gale Farlow* 
88. 30 Cal. 3d at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. (Emphasis added.) 
89. No. LA 31495, slip op. at 10 (Cal. Supreme Court May 9, 1983). 
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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